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Abstract 
This paper discusses the wrongful imprisonment of the Guildford Four, and the reasons why this 
miscarriage of justice occurred. Contrary to popular opinion that the injustice arose due to police 
malpractice, this paper will conclude that the blame lies primarily with the judiciary for failing to reverse 
the 1975 decision even in the face of what seemed to be insurmountable contradictory evidence. This 
paper analyses the role each branch of government played, as well as discussing the role of public 
perceptions and societal fears of the time.  
Keywords 
Guildford Four, Miscarriage of Justice, Counterterrorism legislation 
I  Introduction  
The role of the respective branches of government is paramount in assessing the 
reasons for this widely deliberated miscarriage of justice case. The legislature, through 
the implementation of the Terrorism Prevention Act (Temporary Measures) 1974, 
conferred onto police wide powers of arrest and detention, particularly through 
extending the period of time officers could lawfully detain accused persons without 
charge. This enabled police malpractice to thrive in an already tense political context, in 
which there was vast pressure on officers to obtain results. While this miscarriage of 
justice was due to a comprehensive failure on the part of the justice system as a whole, 
the role of the judiciary in both securing and sustaining the wrongful convictions was 
arguably the most prevalent. The appeals procedure in the case of the Guildford Four 
failed to expose or accept the errors of judgement made in the initial trial, which is 
representative of the reluctance on behalf of the British judiciary to have to admit faults 
within itself. Upholding the reputation of the judiciary was evidently considered to be 
of higher importance than granting innocent individuals their freedom. A key lesson 
from the Guildford experience is the importance of protecting the liberties of the 
individual, especially when times are alive with fear and prejudice.  
II Historical Context  
A  The Bombings  
On 5 October 1974 two bombs were planted in public houses in Guildford, located 30 
miles southwest of London; the Horse and Groom and the Seven Stars. Guildford was 
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the opening attack in a new IRA offensive on the mainland, as part of a redoubled effort 
to drive the British out of Northern Ireland. Four soldiers and one civilian were killed, 
whilst a further 57 were injured.1  The atmosphere both locally and nationally in the 
wake of the Guildford attack was tense. There were increased clashes between the 
town’s small Irish community and the locals, pub managers began to ban soldiers from 
frequenting their bars (driven by fears of a repeat bombing) and wire netting was 
erected inside bar windows to break the flight of any bomb that may be thrown in.
2
 
Conservative Politicians were quick to call for the restoration of capital punishment, 
among them a criminal barrister who would proceed to prosecute the Guildford Four, 
Sir Micheal Havers.
3
 The Surrey Bomb squad was formed in response to national 
pressure to find those responsible, and one hundred and fifty detectives were drafted in 
from across the region.4 The main lines of enquiry focussed on both available 
intelligence information on who was currently operational and capable of organizing an 
expert time bombing within the IRA, and locating the 380 customers of the pubs in 
order to trace, interview and eliminate possible suspects.
5
 
B ‘The Guildford Four’ 
Paul Hill, Gerard Conlon and Patrick Armstrong each came to England individually to 
find employment and escape the turbulent times in West Belfast. Although senior 
provisional IRA sources have always denied that Hill was a member, Hill himself 
conceded in 1985 that he was involved to a limited extent.6 It was due to Hill’s 
friendship with Martin Skillen that Hill got involved in the single event that linked him 
to the Provisional IRA and brought him to the attention of the security forces. On 20 
July 1974 Brian Shaw was found dead, executed by the IRA as a suspected army spy. 7 
While Skillen carried out the shooting, Hill was held to be an accomplice to Shaw’s 
murder due to his connections to Skillen. Hill left for England in August to avoid the 
security forces and being questioned by the IRA for a separate incident involving Hills 
                                                            
1
 Robert Kee Trial and Error: The True Events Surrounding the Convictions and Trials of the Guildford Four 
and the Maguire Seven (Penguin Books, London 1989) at 11.  
2 Grant McKee and Ros Franey Time Bomb: Irish Bombers, English Justice and the Guildford Four ( 
Bloomsbury, London, 1988) at 51.  
3
 McKee and Franey, above n 2, at 32; and (28 November 1974) 882 GBPD HC 644.   
4 McKee and Franey, above n 2, at 47. 
5 McKee and Franey, above n 2, at 48.  
6 Hill: “Sure I was involved, I’m not denying that. We were in a transition period where people were going from 
battalion structure to the cell structure. There were only four of us left in D company.” McKee and Franey, 
above n 2, at 69.  
7 McKee and Franey, above n 2, at 71. 
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apparent misappropriation of a weapon (a serious offence in the IRA lexicon, worthy of 
either a ‘knee capping’ or death).8  
Hill’s childhood friend Conlon never showed any interest in becoming an IRA recruit, 
nor was he sought after. The IRA had no use or desire for a petty criminal who liked 
“money, drink, gambling and girls”.9 Conlon financed his costly tastes through minor 
thefts, and spent his time in London floating in and out of public hostels which 
provided refuge for Irish Catholics in England. Patrick Armstrong went to school with 
Conlon and Hill; however the four year age gap meant they had little to do with each 
other until a chance meeting reunited them in London. Conlon described Armstrong as 
a “timid, mild man” who had no criminal convictions.10 He helped organize events for 
charity and worked with elderly people as a member of the Catholic Young Men’s 
Association.11  Armstrong’s girlfriend was 17 year old Carole Richardson. The “very 
young and very English” Richardson followed a similar lifestyle to Hill, Conlon and 
Armstrong; existing of sporadic employment, squat living, petty crime and drug 
abuse.12  
All four were fairly rootless individuals who had often been at the margin of society 
and the law. There is no indication however that any of them were financed by the IRA. 
The IRA had an extensive catalogue of trained members to avoid relying on such 
amateurs. Despite their status as unlikely suspects they were arrested within two 
months of the bombings. Hill was arrested on 28 November 1974 under the Prevention 
of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 (the first to be arrested under the Act) 
and made a written confession within 24 hours implicating Conlon.13 There is 
ambiguity surrounding the reasons for Hill’s arrest but the contemporary version of the 
Surrey police is that the lead came from an anonymous, unverifiable tip by a military 
intelligence officer, who considered Hill to be suspect since the Shaw affair.14 Conlon 
was arrested in Belfast two days later, also confessing after three days of rigorous 
                                                            
8 McKee and Franey, above n 2, at 75. 
9 Gerry Conlon Proved Innocent: The story of Gerry Conlon of the Guildford Four (Penguin Group, London, 
1990) at 28.  
10 Conlon, above n 9, at 53.  
11 McKee and Franey, above n 2, at 118. 
12 Conlon, above n 9, at 54.  
13 Paul Hill and Ronan Bennett  Stolen Years: Before and After Guildford (Transworld Publishers Ltd, London, 
1990) at 61.  
14 McKee and Franey, above n 2, at 88; and Clive Borrell “IRA informer got £350 for vital clue that led to 
bombers” The Times (England, 23 October 1975) at 5. 
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interrogations, implicating Armstrong and Richardson in the process. On 3 December 
1974, Armstrong and Richardson were arrested in an extremely drug induced state and 
within 48 hours succumbed to police pressure and made self-incriminating 
admissions.
15
 All four had been denied access to a solicitor for several days and 
retracted their confessions shortly after interrogations.   
III The Legislature  
A  The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974    
1        Origins of the Act  
At the general election on 10 November 1974 Harold Wilson’s Labour government 
returned, and Roy Jenkins was reappointed Home Secretary.16 Rumours swept through 
the Parliamentary lobby system that the Home Secretary was examining a range of 
legislative measures to combat the IRA.17 Explosions in Birmingham on the 21 
November 1974, which killed 21 people and injured 150 more, made public and 
political clamour for new legislation against the IRA irresistible. Parliament’s reaction 
to the bombings was influenced by two competing considerations - On the one hand 
there was the view that much could already be achieved to combat terrorism via the 
fullest application of the criminal law.18 On the other hand, the strong desire to respond 
to what was perceived as “the greatest threat to the country since the end of the Second 
World War” brought about calls for dictatorial legislation with far reaching powers.
19
 
Debates in the House of Commons on provisions of the Act highlighted the fact that 
Birmingham and Guildford were no isolated events, but part of a larger climate of 
violence that had to be brought to an end.
20
 It was by means of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Bill that the terrorist threat was to be alleviated, where national security 
considerations took priority over competing civil liberty concerns.   
                                                            
15 McKee and Franey, above n 2, at 88. 
16 McKee and Franey , above n 2, at 50. 
17 McKee and Franey,  above n 2, at 50. 
18 (28 November 1974) 882 GBPD HC 656.  
19 Clive Walker The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1986) at 
22; and (28 November 1974) 882 GBPD HC 643 and 657.  
20 (28 November 1974) 882 GBPD HC 650.  
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On 27 November 1974 Jenkins introduced the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Bill containing “draconian measures unprecedented in peacetime.”21 The 
Bill was passed two days later with no dissent. The Act is often portrayed as a Bill 
hastily drawn up in response to a single event, however this is misleading. There had 
been a number of terrorist attacks on the mainland since 1973 and Parliament had close 
precedents for counterterrorism legislation at its disposal.22 The Act, which built on the 
existing antipathy towards the Irish in contemporary England, was limited to Irish 
terrorism since there was no time to design a more comprehensive statute.23 This was a 
point of contention in the House of Commons; there were fears that limiting the 
application of the Act to terrorist acts connected to Northern Ireland would allow it to 
be used as a weapon to maintain an unjustified status quo.24  According to Hillyard in 
an extensive study published in 1993, the Act constructed a ‘suspect community’ 
against a background of Irish racism.25 There was no resolute effort to ensure the Act 
respected civil liberties and existing legal traditions thus it did not contain any limiting 
principles. The nature of the Act correctly illustrates Lord Scarman’s warning in 
Liversidge v Anderson [1942]:26 
When times are normal and fear is not stalking the land, English law sturdily protects 
the freedom of the individual and respects human personality. But when times are 
abnormally alive with fear and prejudice, the common law is at a disadvantage: it 
cannot resist the will, however frightened and prejudiced it may be, of Parliament. 
The Act created a dual track justice system within Britain whereby those suspected of 
political violence connected with Northern Ireland and those suspected of ordinary 
crime were subject to very different investigative and custodial powers. Ordinary 
criminals continued to be dealt with under the criminal law while those suspected of 
political violence were dealt with under a system that provided far fewer safeguards in 
                                                            
21 Keith Weston ‘Counter Terrorism Policing and the Rule of Law: The Best of Friends’ in Nigel D. White (ed) 
Counter Terrorism: International Law and Practise (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012)  at 345.  
22 The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions Act) 1973, Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) 
1939, Immigration Act 1971. 
23 (28 November 1974) 882 GBPD HC 657.  
24 (28 November 1974) 882 GBPD HC 657. 
25 Brenda J. Lutz and James M. Lutz “The trial of the Guildford Four: Government Error or Government 
Persecution?” (2010) 14  TPV 113; and Paddy Hillyard Suspect Community: Peoples Experience of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain (Pluto Press, England, 1993)  
26 Walker, above n 19, at 24.  
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respect of civil liberties.
27
 Key changes implemented by the Act were the proscription 
of organisations listed under Schedule 1 (The IRA had previously only been banned in 
Northern Ireland), the right to make exclusion orders against any person concerned in 
the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism and the extension of 
police powers of arrest and detention under section 7.28 For the purposes of assessing 
the role the Act played in imprisoning the Guildford Four, the powers conferred under 
section 7 are fundamental.  
2 The role of section 7  
Section 7(2) extended the period of detention without charge from 48 hours to seven 
days, provided that the extension has been sanctioned by the Secretary of State.29 
During this protracted detention the Act provided no requirement for the police to allow 
suspect’s access to a solicitor. It also provided no guidance as to the types of cases 
which would sufficiently justify the extension of the detention period, and kept it as 
wide as “any particular case.”30 As none of the Four were charged within the two day 
period, all the charges could be said to be an immediate product of the new powers. 
Hill, Conlon, Armstrong and Richardson were all subject to lengthy interrogations, 
while consistently being reminded of the further five days of confinement and 
interrogations that they would endure if they failed to confess.
31
 If the seven day 
detention period had not been introduced or widely enforced, and/or legal access had 
been permitted, the more likely scenario is that the four would not have confessed and 
the sole evidence used by the prosecution to connect them to the bombings would not 
have existed.  
On implementation of the Bill Jenkins told the House of Commons that the measures 
made permissible under section 7 would result in the infringement of civil liberties, but 
that these would be used as “selectively” as possible.32 He nevertheless conceded that 
they would still “inconvenience” some people who may not deserve it.33 The powers 
conferred were not used selectively: Out of the first 594 applications for this extension 
                                                            
27 Paddy Hillyard “The Politics of Criminal Injustice: The Irish Dimension” in Mike McConville (ed) Criminal 
Justice in Crisis (Edward Elgar Publishing, Surrey, 1994) 69 at 72.  
28 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 
29 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, s7(2)  
30 Walker, above n 19, at 29.   
31 Conlon, above n 9, at 78 
32 (28 November 1974) 882 UKPD HC 634.  
33 McKee and Franey, above n 2, at 85 
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the Home Secretary refused only two.
34
 Contrary to Jenkins’s forecasts, it was a power 
used consistently and only refused in exceptional cases. It is evident in the case of the 
Guildford Four that the detention period did more than merely “inconvenience” 
innocent people, but played a key role in incarcerating them for the majority of their 
youth.  
The detention period permitted via section 7 was later criticized by the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) in the case of Brogan and others.
35
 Four persons (separate to 
the Guildford Four) had been subjected to prolonged detention without arrest, discharge 
or being promptly brought before a judge due to the powers conferred under section 7. 
The ECHR held all four cases had violated several paragraphs of Article 5 of the 
Convention, the right to liberty and security.36 The British government responded by 
announcing its intent to derogate from the Convention and maintain the extended 
detention period due to the context of the terrorist campaign and the overriding need to 
bring terrorists to justice.37 This announcement was made in 1988, less than a year 
before the Guildford Four were to be released and have their convictions overturned as 
unsafe.  Legislative policy in 1974 favoured state security over the security and rights 
of the individual, and it is doubtful whether the position has in fact changed in the UK 
today. By section 12(1) the 1974 Act was due to expire on the 28 May 1975, however 
due to continued conflict the Act was renewed on a regular basis.38 In March 1989 
legislation was introduced to replace the temporary measures and made the powers 
conferred a permanent feature of the statute books.
39
  
The role of the legislature in the context of the Guildford Four was ultimately to act as 
an enabler. It implemented repressive legislation that was exclusively applicable to the 
Northern Ireland conflict, which in turn enabled the executive branch to exploit and 
misuse the powers conferred upon it.  
IV The Executive 
A The Police  
                                                            
34 McKee and Franey, above n 2, at 143. 
35 Brogan and others v the United Kingdom (11209/84) Plenary Court, ECHR 29 November 1988.  
36 Antonio Tanca ‘Human Rights, Terrorism and Police Custody: The Brogan Case’ (1990) 1 EJIL 269.  
37Tanca, above n 36, at 277. 
38 Walker, above n 19,  at 24. 
39 The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. 
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The Guildford Four act as a perfect illustration of the dangers of granting the police 
force with broad powers of arrest and detention in an already fraught political context. 
The pressure on police to get results is understandably of a very different degree 
following acts of political violence, in contrast to most instances of ordinary crime. The 
PTA facilitated police corruption to thrive at a time when the police force was 
systematically straining under the political and public pressure to find those 
responsible.  
In the immediate aftermath of the bombings the Surrey police took 4000 statements and 
600 photographs, interviewed 6000 people and initiated 2  000 further factual inquiries, 
at a cost of $1, 500, 000 for 20, 000 hours of overtime.40 Police had virtually exhausted 
their efforts to little avail, while the list of politically motivated bombings continued to 
grow.  Once Hill, Conlon, Armstrong and Richardson were detained, an inept police 
investigation followed, where incidents of police malpractice were frequent. The Surrey 
police effectively preordained a conviction for the Four, greatly facilitated by the 
passage of the PTA. Suspects in terrorism cases should be tried within the rule of law, 
protected against arbitrary arrest and detention, protected against discrimination and 
should not be subjected to torture or degrading treatment.41 The Surrey police failed in 
this respect on all counts. 
1 Bullying interrogations  
Police conduct in 1974 was governed by the Judges’ Rules. The police maintained 
throughout the trial that their interrogations were conducted in accordance with them; 
however confessions or statements can only be used as evidence if they are given 
voluntarily.42 The Judges' Rules accept police interrogation in custody  so long as it 
does not go so far as to force or induce a confession against the suspect's will "by fear 
of prejudice or hope of advantage, exercised or held out by a person in authority, or by 
oppression".43  
The methods of interrogation used on the four overstepped the proper bounds of police 
conduct. The four suffered from police interrogation techniques designed to break 
down suspects – including sleep deprivation by constant exposure to light and noise, 
                                                            
40 McKee and Franey, above n 2, at 52. 
41 Irwin Cotler “Towards a Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy” (1998) 10 TPV 1 at 4.  
42 Doreen McBarnet “The Royal Commission and the Judges’ Rules” (1981) 8 BJLS 109 at 109. 
43 McBarnet, above n 42, at 109. 
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food deprivation, severe verbal abuse, strip searches, being held in solitary 
confinement, long enforced periods of standing and physical abuse and beatings.44 Each 
of the four consistently maintained the confessions were obtained by violence and 
threats. Hill detailed:
45
  
We insisted that we had made the admissions only after being brutalized, ill-treated 
and threatened, and that they consisted of a mixture of innocent background 
information, pure invention and details of the Guildford bombings supplied by the 
police themselves. 
Conlon also alleged that Walter Simmons, a Surrey police officer investigating the 
bombings, made threats to arrange a ‘sectarian murder’ of his mother and sister in 
Belfast.
46
 Richardson got so distressed during her interrogation that she had to be seen 
by a police surgeon, and has recollection difficulties due to being given 20 capsules of 
sedative medication on the day of her arrest.47 As Richardson was participating in 
heavy drug use prior to being arrested she was also suffering from barbiturate 
withdrawal at the time of her confession. Through interrogating her in such a state, 
police officers improperly took advantage of the fact that she was drug affected when 
taken into custody.48  
The police forces’ claims of innocence were stated in the context of a decade where 
police were given no formal training on questioning suspects and the Judges’ rules that 
were designed to secure fair procedures did not possess the force of the law, and were 
thus frequently ignored.49 Furthermore, instances of maltreatment at the hands of the 
police were not limited to the Guildford Four and similar complaints were made by the 
Birmingham six.50 The police officers assertions were further undermined when 
evidence came to light in the 1989 Appeal of the Guildford Four that trial police 
officers had ‘seriously misled the Court’ on matters regarding the timing and nature of 
the interrogations.51 If they lied about these matters, they are likely to have lied about 
                                                            
44 Conlon, above n 9; and Hill and Bennett, above n 13; and Brenda J. Lutz and James M. Lutz “The trial of the 
Guildford Four: Government Error or Government Persecution?” (2010) 14  TPV 113 at 117. 
45 Hill and Bennett, above n 13, at 61. 
46 Conlon, above n 9, at 80 . 
47 Gisli Gudjonsson The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and Testimony (John Wiley & Sons, Sussex, 
1992) at 266. 
48 Mckee and Franey, above n 2, at 477. 
49 McBarnet, above n 42, at 110. 
50 Clive Borrell “Police investigate injuries to bomb defendants” The Times (UK, 20 December 1974).  
51 Hill and Bennett,  above n 13, at 62. 
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the conduct administered during these interrogations. It is difficult to reconcile Hill, 
Conlon, Armstrong and Richardson’s accounts of their interrogation experiences with 
the police force’s claims.  
2 Falsified statements  
When it came to writing the statements and providing details of the Guildford 
bombings the Surrey police force played an instrumental role. The confession 
statements contained intricate details in regards to the bomb making, the geography of 
Guildford and the layout of the pub, all information which had been known to the 
police prior to taking the four into custody. On matters which the police knew nothing, 
for example who drove the car to Guildford or what the bombs looked like, the 
confessions were in total conflict.52 The inconsistencies in the statements lie in the 
areas in which the four intentionally made up details to satisfy the police and bring the 
interrogations to an end. The remaining matters were suggested to the detainees by the 
police while some of the statements were wholly dictated to them. Each of the four 
have separately stated they initially confessed as a way of escaping an intolerable 
situation with the view that they could retract their statements while in the presence of a 
lawyer or in the safety of a court room.  
3 Concealed alibi evidence  
The alibi evidence produced by the defendants was mixed. Conlon’s alibi was that he 
was in a hostel at Quex Road, London on the 5th of October.53 It was later discovered 
that the police were in possession of one statement by Charles Edward Burke, a 
Greengrocer who shared a room with Hill and Conlon at the hostel, which amounted to 
verification of his alibi.54 Armstrong had an alibi that he was in a squat at a time when 
people were being arrested, for which witnesses were available but no evidence was 
provided by the police to confirm this had taken place.55 Richardson’s alibi evidence 
was by far the most compelling, as she was at a concert in South West London almost 
40 miles from Guildford where she had a photograph posing with the band.
56
 The 
police maintained that Richardson could have travelled the distance and planted the 
                                                            
52 Grant McKee “The Guildford Four”  The Listener (UK, 26 June 1986)   
53 Gudjonsson, above n 47, at 262. 
54 Jack O’Sullivan “The Guildford Four: Alibi evidence kept from defence for 14 years” The Independent  (UK,  
19 October 1989) 
55 Gudjonsson, above n 47, at 262. 
56 Gudjonsson, above n 47,  at 266. 
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bomb at Guildford before returning to South London 50 minutes later.  A police driver 
who ignored the speed limit claimed to have made the journey in 45 minutes.57 The 
police were patently willing to use whatever measures necessary to obtain convictions 
of the four.  
4 Explanations: Bad apples or systems failure?  
The unremitting way in which the police continued to prosecute the four despite the 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary suggests there was more at play than simply a 
blind predetermined judgement of guilt. Two broad theories have been explored by 
scholars as a means of explaining illegal police conduct in miscarriage of justice 
cases.58 The “bad apple theory” focusses on the individual officers deviant actions and 
is shorthand for an individualistic model of police deviance.59 Under this explanation, it 
follows that by the time the Surrey police force had Hill, Conlon, Armstrong and 
Richardson in custody they fixed on the suspects and worked up a belief of guilt. Either 
they overstepped the boundaries of police conduct due to these assumptions, or they 
were aware of their innocence but continued regardless, due to the ease with which 
these four outcasts could be offered up as scapegoats. The theory of police malpractice 
to account for what happened lays the blame of the miscarriage of justice on a few 
deviant and bent police officers.
60
  However there are obvious issues with this theory, 
succinctly identified by Punch: 61  
The ‘rotten apple theory won`t work any longer. Corrupt police officers are not 
natural-born criminals, nor morally wicked men [sic], constitutionally different from 
their honest colleagues. The task of corruption control is to examine the barrel, not 
just the apples – the Organization, not just the individuals in it – because corrupt 
police are made, not born. 
It is difficult to conceive that many of those involved did not believe that some or all 
were innocent given the weight of the contradictory evidence which they had to go to 
such pains to conceal, alter and manipulate. The competing explanation argues that the 
                                                            
57 Gudjonsson, above n 47, at 262. 
58
 Julia Hall To Serve without Favour: Policing, Human Rights and Accountability in Northern Ireland (Human 
Rights Watch, Helsinki, 1997) at 141 and;  Peter Gottschalk Knowledge Management in Police Oversight 
(Brown Walker Press, Florida, 2009)  at 146; and Hillyard, above n 27, at 76. 
59 Gottschalk, above n 58, at 145.   
60 Hillyard, above n 27, at 76.  
61 Gottschalk, above n 58, at 146.
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majority of those involved in the arrests knew they were innocent but because of 
extraneous political circumstances of the time they were encouraged to secure 
convictions. This has been termed the “rotten orchard theory”, and is the favoured 
explanation by many within the Irish community.
62
 This theory views the Guildford 
Four as convenient scapegoats, who as individuals on the periphery of society and 
being Irish Catholics, were consequently vulnerable. The overwhelming contradictory 
evidence gives credence to this explanation.   
B  The Role of Government: A Political Injustice? 
The government has chosen to justify the miscarriage of justice in terms of the ‘bad 
apple theory.’ This is evident by the prosecution of only three of the many officers 
involved in the Guildford Four case, as it shifts the blame on a small portion of the 
police force rather than the flaws of the police force or the justice system as a whole. 
Was this an example of a political injustice rather than a criminal injustice? While the 
trial of the Guildford Four did have political implications, this was not a partisan trial in 
which the conviction was virtually assured to serve the purposes of the government.63  
The government did nevertheless play a key role in maintaining the convictions, and 
ensuring the Guildford Four remained behind bars; it was unwilling to reopen the case 
or admit errors had been made until forced to do so due to public indignation. The need 
to reassure the public of the effectiveness of the police force and the courts, limited the 
ability of the government either to see miscarriages had occurred or to publicly 
acknowledge them. Margaret Thatcher, who led the conservative party until 1990, was 
notorious for having a jaundiced view of Irish affairs and an uncompromising approach 
to the IRA.  This was epitomised in her approach to the hunger strikes in which 
Thatcher allowed notable political figures to die in prison rather than concede to the 
request of being granted political prisoner status.64 In doing so, Thatcher hugely 
alienated the nationalist population in Northern Ireland and England.65 Her position on 
Irish affairs is also evident in her lack of action or comment on the Guildford Four. In 
Thatcher’s own memoirs which are a reflection of her eleven years in power, the 
Birmingham six only receive a mention in a footnote and the Guildford Four merit no 
                                                            
62 Hillyard, above n 27, at 76 and; Maurice Punch “Rotten Orchards: “Pestilence”, Police Misconduct and 
Systems Failure” (2003) 13 IJRP 171 .  
63 Lutz and Lutz, above n 25, at 114.  
64
 Peter Taylor Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein (Bloomsbury, London, 1997) at 238.  
65 Taylor, Above n 64, at 243.  
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reference at all.66 Only once public campaigns for their release took place did the 
government pay the issue of the Guildford Four any serious attention, as continuing 
publicity was more damaging then an admission of error.67  
While the government were guilty of inaction whilst the Four were incarcerated, the 
institution which played the most fundamental role in allowing this miscarriage to 
occur was the Judiciary.  The trial of the Guildford Four opened on 16 September 1975 
at the Central Criminal Court and the key point of contention was the disputed 
confessionary evidence.  
V The Judiciary  
A  The Trial  
1   The Prosecution  
The Prosecution argued that Hill, Conlon and Armstrong were all members of the 
Provisional IRA but no evidence was produced to substantiate this claim. The crown 
prosecution was led by Sir Michael Havers who dismissed the 140 inconsistencies and 
inaccuracies between the confession statements of the four defendants as an elaborate 
IRA counter interrogation technique.68 A newspaper reporter from the Times reporting 
the case in 1975 described the state of affairs as being as follows:69 
The object is to confuse interrogators by answering with half-truths; that is admitting 
taking certain actions, and making remarks which were in fact taken and made by 
other members of the gang. By adopting that ruse they can confuse witnesses, 
especially when it comes to identification. It also makes the jury’s task difficult when 
they have literally dozens of false statements as in this present trial. The ruse, 
however, has failed with the all-male jury, which for the past six weeks has unravelled 
the web.  
In reality the inconsistencies were due to the defendant’s lack of knowledge about the 
bombings. The ease with which the jury, the judge and the media readily accepted the 
prosecutions explanations of the inconsistent statements is concerning. It is a likely 
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consequence of allowing the anti-Irish sentiment and public and political pressure to 
place the blame to enter the court room.   
2 The Defence 
The defence’s case relied upon challenging the admissibility and reliability of the 
confession statements. The available alibi witnesses were produced to show the 
defendants had been elsewhere at the time of the bombings, but these were made to 
look “shifty, confused and stupid” by Havers.
70
 Counsel for Armstrong and Conlon 
suggested that a Belfast upbringing might have conditioned them to be afraid of 
authority, due to the systematic practises by the security forces of subjecting suspects to 
ill treatment.71 The defence’s case would have been strengthened if evidence supporting 
the four’s ill treatment during the interrogations had been produced. This was available 
in relation to Conlon as doctors in Belfast were able to attest to Conlon suffering from a 
kidney condition whilst being held in Belfast for which he was refused proper treatment 
and medication.72 Furthermore, if the defence had focussed its case more on 
challenging the prosecutions assertions that the Four were funded by the Provisional 
IRA it may have convinced the jury the IRA would never have accepted the likes of 
Conlon, Armstrong and Hill into their higher ranks, let alone given them the 
responsibility of launching a violent terrorist campaign in England. As one defence 
solicitor put it: “It would be like asking wally to plant a bomb. No one in their right 
mind would want to have anybody involved who took LSD. It’s nonsensical.”73  
Lord Devlin and Lord Scarman in a commentary on the Guildford Four described the 
current state of the law in instances where defendants have confessed as involving a 
presumption of guilt, rather than a presumption of innocence. The accused, according to 
Scarman and Devlin, “go into the dock with the halters of their confessions about their 
necks and unless they can slip free of them they are doomed.”74 The defence failed 
because the defendants were unable to convince the jury of the falsity of their 
confession statements. Despite the legal position, the onus was on the Four to disprove 
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the accusations levelled against them, rather than on the prosecution to remove the 
presumption of innocence. In effect, they were tried under a presumption of guilt.  
3 Evidence 
The sole pieces of evidence against the four were the questionable confession 
statements. Excepting some highly circumstantial evidence surrounding similarities 
between a pocket watch found in Armstrong’s previous residence and the watch used in 
the bombings, there was no identification ever produced to link the four to the 
bombings.75 The confession evidence should not have been admissible in court on 
grounds of involuntariness. In Scotland, the case would not have even made it to court 
without independent corroborating evidence.76  Barrie Irving, a forensic psychologist 
who played a crucial role in reforming the pre-trial procedures in the English system 
made the following comments in regards to the evidence admitted at trial:77 
My conclusion after reading Armstrong’s statements was that without corroboration in 
a case of this kind one is on very dangerous ground. Where there are additional 
problems about the way in which the interrogation was handled then one is on more 
difficult ground still.  
Under UK law there is no requirement for the corroboration of evidence, aside from in 
some special cases in which there was an obligation on the judge to warn the jury that 
there was a risk in relying solely on the specific piece of evidence. Justice Donaldson, 
the presiding trial judge, failed to provide any warnings based on the lack of 
corroborating evidence.78  
4 The Judge 
Mr Justice Donaldson’s summary of the evidence for the jury was of exceptional length 
and ran to 126 pages of transcript.79 Donaldson J emphasised the neutrality of his role 
and consistently reminded the jury that the verdict ‘is entirely a matter for you’.
 80
 
However it is a rare jury that does not absorb the judicial message which, even if not 
passed explicitly may pass through implication. Donaldson’s summary was layered 
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with judicial messages: He did not warn the jury of the dangers involved in relying on 
uncorroborated evidence, particularly confession statements made prior to the 
defendants being able to access a solicitor. In regards to Richardson’s case, he 
emphasised the fact that she had been the only one to complain of police brutality while 
in custody but used this fact to emphasise the reliability of the police officers evidence, 
as they had readily admitted she had made a complaint in this instance. Ultimately the 
case against the four stood or fell on the confessions. Donaldson J framed the matter for 
the jury as being an issue of whether the police officers or whether the four accused had 
lied.81 His final words in summarising Armstrong’s case would not have left the 
defence with much optimism: “I would not have made a false confession, but he 
[Armstrong] may be different from me.”82  
Donaldson J evidently perceived the four as guilty of the crimes accused. Given the 
subtexts conveyed in the judge’s summary and the tense political climate instilling fear 
and distrust into the general public, it is not surprising the jury reached a unanimous 
guilty verdict. All four members were sentenced to life imprisonment: Richardson with 
a recommendation that she should not serve less than 20 years on charges of conspiracy 
to cause explosives, Conlon not less than 30, Armstrong not less than 35, and Hill was 
ordered to be detained until “either age or infirmity” decrees that he should be 
released.83 Donaldson J made it explicit to the four that prison for life must mean just 
that, and they should not expect to be released within 12 – 15 years.84 He also 
emphasised that had the 1965 Act abolishing the death penalty not been introduced, 
three of the accused would have been executed.85 In his final address Donaldson J 
famously stated: “The English language is rich in words, but no single one can 
adequately describe your crime.”
86
 
B  The Appeal System   
It is the fundamental role of appellate courts to correct errors made, and to ensure the 
courts maintain consistent and equitable outcomes. The appeals procedure in the case of 
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the Guildford Four however persistently failed to expose or accept the deep seated 
injustices. The benefit of hindsight served of no advantage for the Four, who 
unswervingly failed in their efforts to have the injustices corrected.  
1 The 1977 Appeal  
Following the ‘Balcombe Street Siege’ in December 1975, four IRA members who 
were convicted of separate crimes, claimed during interrogation that the Court had 
convicted the wrong people for the Guildford bombings.
87
 When placed on trial they 
refused to plead, firstly because of the IRA custom to deny the jurisdiction and 
secondly because the indictment did not include two charges on which they were guilty 
and on which innocent people had been convicted.88 These four men were Brendan 
Dowd, Joseph O’Connell, Edward Butler and Harry Duggan, all of whom hailed from 
committed Sinn Fein families with close ties to the Provisional IRA. Lord Devlin and 
Lord Scarman described the Four as “fanatics for whom the truth, like themselves, was 
a servant of the cause.”89 The fresh evidence relating to the Balcombe Street gangs’ 
claimed sole involvement in the Guildford bombings was presented at an appeal 
hearing in Guildford in October 1977. Dowd, O’Connell, Butler and Duggan gave 
comprehensive statements of the details surrounding the Guildford bombings, which 
could have only been known by them through participation.  
Lord Justice Roskill, sitting with Lord Justice Lawton and Mr Justice Boreham held 
that there had been a “cunning and skilful attempt to deceive the Court by putting 
forward fake evidence.”
90
 The judges dismissed scientific evidence indicating that the 
Guildford bombings were virtually identical to other bombings committed by the 
Balcombe street gang. Although there had been no evidence to show that the IRA men 
had ever been in contact with the Guildford Four, they concluded it was a case of the 
IRA supporting the IRA.91 This was based on a letter to O’Connell which referred to 
“two Belfast fellows” which the judges concluded must have been Hill and Conlon.92 
Lord Justice Roskill even warned Duggan prior to giving evidence at the Guildford 
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Appeal that he need not give evidence which incriminated himself.
93
 The Court again 
ignored the inconsistencies in the original confession evidence. Instead of sending the 
case back to the jury to reconsider the confession statements in light of the new 
evidence, the bench assessed the case themselves and refused to quash the convictions. 
The Court described the confessions as “the partially true intermingled with the 
deliberately false.”94 It concluded that even if the four men were involved in the 
bombings to some extent, this must have been with the assistance of the Guildford 
Four, and the convictions of the Guildford Four should therefore not be quashed. The 
judges decided that; “We are all of the clear opinion that there are no possible grounds 
for doubting the justice of any of these convictions.”
95
  
The 1977 Appeal decision has come under considerable criticism within the legal 
community, particularly from Lord Devlin and Lord Scarman in their 1988 report 
entitled; ‘Justice and the Guildford Four: Alleged IRA bombers.’ It is exemplary of the 
deep reluctance on behalf of the judiciary to have to admit major miscarriages of 
justice. The UK appeal structure is historically an appeal structure that is reluctant to 
reopen cases. Prior to the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907 creating the Criminal Appeal 
Court, there was no appeal available from a ruling and the sleep of the final verdict lay 
undisturbed.
 96
 The 1907 Act allowed appeals involving fresh evidence, but conferred 
no powers onto a Court to order a retrial. As a result, all that could be done if the 
evidence was credible was to quash the verdict.97 The Criminal Appeal Act of 1968 
reformed the law and allowed a retrial in cases in which fresh credible evidence had 
come to light, which, according to Devlin and Scarman, should naturally be by jury, as 
this is how all indictable crime had been tried for centuries. 98 If the Court has received 
new evidence which might destroy the verdict, that is a circumstance which alters the 
case and must either be set aside as unsafe or a retrial must be ordered. What the Court 
of Appeal essentially did in the 1977 Appeal was a retrial without the jury, reinstating a 
fresh guilty verdict without allowing a jury to hear the fresh evidence.  
This is the aspect of the appeal that Lords Scarman and Devlin are most critical of.  It 
was, as Devlin and Scarman put it, a case of the Appeal judges usurping the role of the 
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jury. They were also hugely critical of the House of Lords decision of DPP v Stafford 
[1974] which enabled the Court of Appeal to interpret the Act in such a way that 
allowed judges to hear and determine new evidence for themselves. In so doing, the 
House put a wider construction on the Criminal Appeal Act, vastly minimizing the role 
of juries in retrials.99 The Act’s role in achieving fair and equitable results through 
retrials has been eroded due to the interpretation put on it by both the House of Lords100 
and the Court of Appeal. Judges were taking on the role of the jury as triers of fresh 
evidence. Roskill and his peers disbelieved the witnesses, therefore held a jury would 
do the same. An official retrial should have been ordered and the fresh evidence of the 
Balcombe Street gang should have been put to the jury to decide on. Had this been so, 
the injustice may have been corrected in a much shorter period.  
The ultimate question therefore is why Roskill and his colleagues, all educated men, 
allowed common sense to desert them when they had the advantage of hearing reliable 
testimony from the legitimate bombers? The answer is the deep reluctance on the behalf 
of the judiciary to have to admit to major miscarriages of justice, in particular given the 
political context of the time.101 There was a conviction held by several senior judges 
and politicians that it was for the good of the people that they believe the legal process 
is above error.
102
 However like all human institutions, the courts are fallible. Instead of 
attempting to perpetuate the fantasy of judicial infallibility, Roskill and his peers should 
have focussed on correcting judicial errors. As Cyril Connolly suggested in 1961, the 
real test of a country’s justice “is not the blunders that are sometimes made but the zeal 
with which they are put right.”103 The eventual release of the Guildford Four in 1989 
was due to surmounting public pressure to have the case reviewed, not due to actions 
taken within the judicial realm. The Balcombe Street gang was never charged in 
relation to the Guildford Four bombings. 
2 Release in 1989 
On the 16
th
 January 1989 the Home Secretary announced that the case of the Guildford 
Four was to be referred back to the Court of Appeal.  New evidence had been produced 
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concerning Richardson’s mental state at the time of her confession.
104
 Avon and 
Somerset police who were appointed by the Home Secretary to look at the confession 
evidence of the four discovered alterations made to the accused’s initial statements.105 
Dates had been altered or typed over, which indicated that written records were not kept 
at the date of the interrogations, but instead were written by the police in 1975 for the 
purposes of the initial trial. The confession evidence which was held by police to be 
contemporaneous was recorded a year after the interrogations took place. Lord Lane 
conceded that the police officers “had lied” at the trial of the Guildford four.106 The 
convictions were quashed on the second appeal on the grounds that the initial 
convictions were unsafe, as “if [the police] were prepared to tell this sort of lie then the 
whole of their evidence becomes suspect.”107 The injustice remained unaddressed for 
twelve years before wrongs were finally righted in the 1989 Appeal. Therefore, while 
the Four have the Court of Appeal to thank for their eventual release, Lord Lane and his 
peers were merely performing the functions of their job successfully, something the 
1977 appeal judges failed in doing.   
Lord Lane expressed the hope that the prosecution of the three police officers who were 
accused of subverting the course of justice would follow speedily; however it was not 
until a year after the discovery of the suspect statements that the three officers were 
even invited to attend a formal interview in London accompanied by solicitors.108 On 
22 November 1990 the Crown Prosecution Service announced that the three detectives 
were to be charged with conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, which, under 
normal circumstances, would expect a trial within six to nine months. In June 1991 
lawyers for the detectives made an abuse of process application claiming that the case 
should be dismissed due to time lapse since 1974 and because the officers could not 
expect a fair trial due to the adverse publicity.109 Although the application was initially 
upheld, the charges were reinstated by the High Court and the trial was eventually fixed 
for April 1993. All three officers were swiftly acquitted; giving credence to Ronan 
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Bennett’s conviction that the case was a mere theatrical production, at the end of which 
British justice was to prosper.110  
VI The Media and Public Perceptions   
The miscarriage of justice happened under the noses of a consenting public and an 
approving media. The quality of justice was strained in the case of Irish defendants 
facing trials in British courts for political offences due to the public perceptions of the 
time, and the Irish being viewed largely as a ‘suspect community’ within the British 
justice system.111 This was also conveyed through the medium of the media. There 
were significant differences in the way Irish people were perceived by the police and 
the wider public in comparison to other ethnic groups in the 1970s. This was largely 
based on popular prejudices and influenced by policing history. The treatment of the 
Irish in the 17th Century by Cromwell’s forces was one of massacre, religious 
persecution, and mass dispossession of the Catholic community. This evolved in the 
19th Century to perceiving the Irish as an inferior race who were stereotypically violent, 
drunk and dishonest. These historically rooted prejudices resurfaced in the 1970s in the 
wake of the conflict and it is evident that race played a role in securing the convictions. 
Headlines in the popular press which applauded police efforts and failed to question the 
irregularities or obvious discrepancies in the case were likely to be prejudicial to 
subsequent court cases.  
The role of an independent media and voting public is to act as a watchdog role as a 
guardian of the public interest. It is in the public interest to ensure civil liberties are 
protected. The Prevention of Terrorism Act was not legislated with such trepidations in 
mind, and the police officers who interrogated the four did not consider the civil 
liberties of the accused as a limitation on their policing powers. Aside from a select few 
who argued their innocence from the beginning, the public and the media failed in their 
role of ensuring civil liberties were not eroded or abused. Instead the public and the 
media fell prey to the tense political context of the time, and fanned the flames of 
discord by taking sides and reinforcing prejudices. 
VII Conclusions  
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In the immediate aftermath of the release of the Guildford Four, increased commentary 
on the state of the criminal justice system was undertaken. A reporter for the Guardian 
succinctly stated:112  
I have always felt a sense of unease about it. There was something not quite right 
about the defendants. They didn’t seem to have the right calibre, the right stuff for 
these sorts of offences. They didn’t have the self-contained air of the Provos. [sic] But 
there was never any doubt throughout the case that they were going to be convicted.  
Under a legal system that allowed extended detention under the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act, and conviction on the basis of uncorroborated confessions alone, it is 
not surprising that the Guildford Four were convicted. Holistically, it is clear that each 
branch of government had a role to play: The legislature through the implementation of 
the PTA, the executive through the conduct of the police force, and the judiciary 
through the questionable 1977 Appeal. The Guildford experience also needs to be 
viewed in the larger context as a symptom of the stress that violence places on the 
institutions of a democratic society trying to respond to the attacks on its very existence 
while balancing its commitments to the rule of law. It has long been acknowledged that 
terrorism and free institutions do not mix very well and societies under siege frequently 
deal with self-preservation in ways that trample civil liberties, or in the England 
specific context, through the passage of the PTA.113 The role of the PTA (or, in a wider 
sense, the legislature) in the case of the Guildford four was to act as an ‘enabler’, 
empowering the police to depart from normal legal standards and engage in pre 
judgement, prejudice and stereotyping.  
The police authorities either deluded themselves into believing the Guildford Fours 
guilt or continued regardless, which, in the light of the overwhelming evidence they had 
supporting the innocence of the Four, is the more likely scenario. Regardless, the blame 
of the miscarriage of justice does not rest solely on the corrupt characters of a select 
few individuals, despite this being the favoured government position. It was almost 
understandable (but not defensible) that the Guildford police, aware of the sense of 
public outrage and anger brought about by the bombings and under great pressure to 
find perpetrators, would sacrifice a few individuals living on the fringe of society in 
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order to gain the greater societal benefit of restoring public confidence in the police 
force as an institution. Given the breadth of powers they were conferred under the PTA, 
officers may have even assumed harsher forms of police interrogation were encouraged 
as part of the legislative intent.  
In allowing this miscarriage of justice to occur, or providing an explanation as to why it 
did occur, it is the British judiciary that played the most fundamental role. The capacity 
of the UK judicial system for finding fault within itself is evidently limited.
114
 The 
conduct of the Appeal Court judges in 1977 in explaining away the accurate accounts 
as to how four separate convicted IRA men planted the Guildford bombs was 
undoubtedly ingenious. In light of this hugely damaging evidence, a retrial was refused 
and convictions remained. The Guildford Four were to remain incarcerated for another 
twelve years before the injustice would be rectified at the second appeal. Despite the 
appellate judges having the benefit of hindsight, and less political and public clamour 
surrounding the case, they were unable to evaluate the case in a non-partisan manner. 
Maintaining public confidence in an unfailing judiciary was of higher importance then 
justice being achieved on an individual level. No reputation, either of an individual or 
of a national system of justice, should condone wrongful imprisonment. The slogan fiat 
justitia, ruat caelum, once a proud judicial mantra that ‘justice be done though the 
heavens may fall’, has manifestly been eroded in instances where the achievement of 
justice would cause the reliability of the British judiciary to be called into question. 
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